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THE BIG GREEN STICK: REDUCING 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
THROUGH U.S. TRADE SANCTIONS 
Andrew F. Upton* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The dramatic growth of the world economy, combined with the 
attendant rise in population and industrial development, threatens to 
exact a significant cost from the limited natural resource base of the 
planet.1 While technological progress has improved global life expec-
tancy, literacy, and food production, the global degradation of the 
environment continues to outpace technological gains.2 Destructive 
environmental trends associated with industrial development, such as 
desertification, destruction of forests, acid rain, global warming, and 
toxic pollution, seriously threaten the sustainability of the earth's 
limited resources.3 
The litany of destructive environmental trends noted above, cou-
pled with a world population projected by the United Nations to 
double or triple in the next century,4 indicates the potential for irre-
versible environmental degradation.5 As consumption inexorably drives 
development past the point of environmental sustainability, the deple-
* Solicitations Editor, 1994-1995, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
I See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 1-2 
(1987). 
2Id. at 2. 
3Id. at 2-3; see Werner Fornos, The 1993 National Conference on Sustainable Solutions-
Population, Consumption and Culture, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 252-53 (1994). 
4 See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 4. 
5Id. 
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tion of natural resources threatens to continue past the point where 
conservation can insure adequate resources for future generations.6 
As states attempt to cope with increased population demands through 
industrial development and the exploitation of natural resources,7 
short-term economic and political gains are bound to overshadow 
longer-term environmental concerns.s Further aggravating the issue 
of environmental degradation is the potential tendency for states to 
engage in a "race of laxity" where states compete to lower environ-
mental standards in an effort to lure foreign investment and essential 
hard currency.9 
Recognition of this unsustainable pattern of development and the 
potential destructive effect on the world's environment and natural 
resources occurred on a number of fronts.lO Since the 1960s, interna-
tional organizations, such as the World Bank, have begun to recon-
figure program goals after reviewing the environmental consequences 
of their international lendingY Issues of state sovereignty and the 
lack of enforcement power in many international organizations, how-
ever, have slowed or stymied efforts to combat international environ-
mental degradation.12 Because of the inability of international organi-
zations to enforce transboundary environmental standards, the efforts 
of international organizations are destined to be piecemeal at best and 
merely empty exhortations at worst.13 
This Comment examines how the use of trade sanctions by the 
United States, specifically the use of Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
trading sanctions, could slow international environmental degrada-
tion by forcing trading partners of the United States to implement 
systematic environmental evaluation. MFN, a system of tariff-reduc-
tion designations by the United States, was initially used as an incen-
61d. 
7 I d. United Nations projections predict that more than 90% of world population growth over 
the next century will occur in the poorest countries. 
8 See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 9-11 (1988). 
9 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 727 (1992). The phrase "race of laxity" was first used to describe a process arising 
within the United States. ld. 
10 See, e.g., THE EARTH SUMMIT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENTS 3-4 (Michael 
Grubb et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter EARTH SUMMIT AGREEMENTS]. 
11 Aid and the Environment, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 25-Jan. 7, 1992, at 54. 
12 EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 11-12 (1992). 
13 ld. at 12. 
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tive for communist bloc countries to adopt policies favorable to the 
United States in opposition to central planning dictates from Mos-
COW.14 Currently, MFN sanctions are a significant part of the debate 
over whether to renew trade preferences for China, with opponents 
of renewal pressing to deny MFN status as a sanction against Chinese 
human rights policies.15 MFN status is currently granted by the United 
States to over 150 nations who export to the American market.16 MFN 
status insures that the favored nation enjoys the lowest possible level 
of tariffs for goods exported to the United States.17 
Section II of this Comment examines the conflict between the im-
position of environmentally sustainable economic practices and the 
established paradigms of international sovereignty. Included in this 
section is an examination of various analyses of global environmental 
destruction, past attempts at international environmental coopera-
tion, and state sovereignty as a roadblock to international coopera-
tion. Section III discusses the use of MFN status as a diplomatic tool. 
Within this section the historical development of MFN status and 
recent applications of MFN status are examined. This framework is 
supplemented by a case study of the use of MFN status as a human 
rights policy enforcement tool in China. Section IV focuses on the 
need for the United States to utilize MFN status as an environmental 
enforcement tool. The need for a declaration of international commit-
ment on a specific environmental situation is examined, and United 
States enforcement of the international will through imposition of 
MFN sanctions on the offending nation is proposed as a solution. 
Section V examines the deforestation of Indonesia as a potential 
target for the application of MFN sanctions. Section VI concludes that 
global environmental degradation is too severe a problem to ignore 
and suggests that international enforcement by the United States is 
a viable method by which to address the crucial dilemma of the 
destruction of our sustainable natural resource base. 
14 Michael S. McMahon, Comment, The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974: 
An Assessment After Five Years, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 525, 535 (1980). 
15 See Robert Drinan & Teresa Kuo, The 1991 Battle for Human Rights in China, 14 HUM. 
RTs. Q. 21, 22 (1992). 
16 Jacob Weisberg, Playing Favorites: Just What Is MFN Anyway?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 
June 18, 1991, at 10. 
17 See Paul Lansing & Eric C. Rose, The Granting and Suspension of Most Favored Nation 
Status for Non Market-Economy Nations: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARv. INT'L L.J. 329, 
332 (1984). 
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II. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY VERSUS 
NATIONAL POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY 
A. The Tragedy of the Global Commons 
The need for international recognition of destructive environmental 
practices, and the need to address such practices, clearly is growing.18 
What one author has called the "evolution of awareness" exemplifies 
the increasing international recognition of transboundary environ-
mental degradation, as well as the increasing speed of international 
response.19 Although problems of scientific agreement and interna-
tional political agreement are not always resolved simultaneously, the 
gap in response time for addressing international environmental is-
sues is narrowing.20 
The sustainability of segmented natural resource bases for individ-
ual nations has long been a recognized concern of governments, espe-
cially for those nations dependent on the export of natural resource-
based commodities.21 Since 1968 and Garrett Hardin's publication of 
The Tragedy of the Commons, environmental policymakers have had 
a clear model of the interconnection of international politics, policy, and 
economics and their effect on environmental sustainability.22 Hardin's 
use of theoretical collective action principles and game theoretic analyses 
paints a logical picture of an environment that cannot sustain unre-
lenting exploitation.23 Market inefficiencies and the social costs of 
nonpaying free-riders, create a downward spiral of environmental 
quality if exploitation is left unrestricted.24 Because the resources of 
the commons are both unowned and unregulated, the tendency of 
both industry and government to externalize sustainability costs will 
18 See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 431, 458 (1993). The evolution from international 
recognition of global warming to international action to combat the climate problem serves as 
an example of international action being taken in response to an international environmental 
problem. [d. 
19 [d. 
20 See id. at 458-63; see also Beryl Crowe, The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited, 166 
SCIENCE 1103 (1969), reprinted in MANAGING THE COMMONS 53 (Garrett Hardin & James 
Baden eds., 1977) (positing that individualized technical or political solutions to the problems of 
environmental corruption are unlikely, and that the intersection of the political and technical 
areas is where most of the world's critical environmental problems lie). 
21 See EARTH SUMMIT AGREEMENTS, supra note 10, at 6. 
22 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), reprinted in 
MANAGING THE COMMONS 21-22 (Garrett Hardin & James Baden eds., 1977). 
23 See id. at 17. 
24 See id. at 22. 
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lead to a rapid depletion of both regenerative and finite resources.25 
Because there is no owner of the environmental commons, there is no 
individual entity with incentive to preserve the commons for future 
generations.26 
Extrapolated to a global scale, it is clear that individual govern-
ments possess no incentive to practice sustainable development.27 
Hardin's model institutionalized and legitimized the scientific and eco-
nomic framework necessary to consider global environmental degra-
dation as an immediate, significant, and international problem.28 Con-
current with Hardin's identification of the sustainability issue, the 
international community, led by the United Nations, began to address 
environmental issues.29 While global conferences on environmental 
issues occurred intermittently before 1968, the frequency and inten-
sity of these efforts increased considerably after 1968.30 
B. International Cooperation and the Brick Wall of National 
Sovereignty 
Commentators have recognized that the prevention of some prob-
lems of environmental degradation may be impractical for individual 
nations.31 Further, the desire to confront the issue of environmental 
degradation may be limited by lack of technical, financial, administra-
tive, or political commitment.32 Efforts by international and nongov-
ernmental organizations to compel individual nations to address is-
sues of environmental degradation have often run into the brick wall 
of national sovereignty.33 Individual states may invoke widely recog-
25 See id. It can be argued that the more a resource is exploited, the more the resource will 
have to be exploited. For example, if Malaysia is running out of trees, remaining trees would 
have to be cut down faster to maintain the same level of wood production; yet this causes the 
supply to run out even faster. Even if trees are replanted, once the threshold of sustainability 
is breached, the resource enters a "death spiral" of ever increasing speed. And as each day 
passes, the potential to maintain the resource at a sustainable, usable level, decreases. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See generally Franz Litz, Comment, Harnessing Market Forces in Natural Resources 
Management: Lessons from the Surf Clam Fishery, 21 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 335-39 (1994) 
(applying the lessons of the tragedy of the commons to the United States fishing industry). 
29 See EARTH SUMMIT AGREEMENTS, supra note 10, at 4. 
30 See id. 
31 See Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond Environmental Diplomacy: The Changing Institutional 
Structure of International Cooperation, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 13, 
15 (John E. Carroll ed., 1988). 
32Id. at 16. 
33 Kamal Hussein & Subrata Roy Chowdury, PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL 
RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at ix, xi (1984). 
676 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:671 
nized international legal principles of national sovereignty in a wide 
range of situations.34 The principle of national sovereignty, however, 
does not extend beyond the borders of the sovereign.35 For example, 
damage to the property of others in international waters has been 
held compensable,36 and international law has recognized the obliga-
tion of upstream states to consider the interests of their downstream 
neighbors.37 The overall concept of national sovereignty, however, is 
firmly established and vigorously adhered to, especially in the area of 
natural resource development.38 
The principle of sovereignty over domestic natural resources can 
be seen as a reaction against the economic exploitation of less-devel-
oped states during periods of colonial exploitation.39 Firm principles 
of national sovereignty have been exercised frequently in post-colo-
nial international law.40 Additionally, the principle of national sover-
eignty has been strengthened as a result of the United Nations' 
efforts toward international cooperation.41 Most recently, the Second 
Principle of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
reiterated the sovereign right of nations to use their own natural 
resources.42 Although the Rio Declaration includes language regard-
34 Id. 
35 See, e.g., Corfu Channel Case 1949 l.C.J. 4, 22-23 (Apr. 9, 1949); Affaire du Lac Lanoux, 12 
R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1957). 
36 See John G. Laylin & Rinaldo L. Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in International River 
Disputes-The Lake Lanoux Case, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 30, 31 (1959) (discussing the difficulties 
in analyzing riparian sovereignty and recommending international adjudication when transbor-
der negotiations fail). 
37Id. 
38 See Hussein & Chowdury, supra note 33, at xiii. 
39 Anthony Carty, The Third World Claim to Economic Self-determination: Economic Rights 
of Peoples: Theoretical Aspects, in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43, 
50 (Subrata Roy Chowdury et al. eds., 1992). 
40 See generally Thomas J. Pax, Comment, Nicaragua v. United States in the International 
Court of Justice: Compulsory Jurisdiction or Just Compulsion?, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 
471 (1985) (United States, asserting sovereignty rights, withdrew from previously agreed upon 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice). The jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice is based on principles of cooperation and good faith and has no formal enforcement 
provisions. Id. at 473; see Hussein & Chowdury, supra note 33, at xi. 
41 See, e.g., Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U. N. Doc. 
AlConf.48/141Corr. 1 (1972), reprinted in lll.L.M. 1420-22 (1972). Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration acknowledges the prominence of individual state sovereignty: 
Id. 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the principles 
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own natural resources pursu-
ant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to insure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
42 See, e.g., Jeffrey Kovar, A Short Guide to the Rio Declaration, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. 
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ing the responsibility of nations to avoid exploiting their resources in 
a manner detrimental to any area outside their borders, a presump-
tion of sovereignty is the primary purpose of the Declaration.43 Be-
cause most transboundary effects resulting from either pollution or 
environmental degradation may not occur until well after the exploi-
tation of the resources, the principle of sovereignty becomes a fallback 
position when proactive environmental policies are too expensive or 
too politically difficult to pursue.44 
The institutionalization of national sovereignty principles, and the 
disregard of international agreements that do not concur with the 
political goals of individual nations, are key determinants of noncoop-
eration in environmental problems.45 While the United Nations is able 
to forge agreements, declarations, and conventions to address a variety 
of global issues, ultimately a lack of military enforcement powers often 
renders United Nations-sponsored declarations ineffective.46 When 
the United Nations sanctions a nation or attempts to influence the 
internal policies of a member state, such efforts are backed by very 
limited formal enforcement power.47 The lack of compelling enforce-
& POL'y 119, 124-25 (1993). Principle 1\vo of the Rio Declaration is exactly the same as Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration with the exception of the insertion of the word "developmental": 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the principles 
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own natural resources pursu-
ant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to 
insure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
43 Id. 
44 See supra note 41 and accompanying text regarding the importance of state developmental 
sovereignty in international declarations. 
45 See Pax, supra note 40, at 47; see also Hussein & Chowdury, supra note 33, at xi. 
46 See Anthony Clark Arend, The Obligation 7b Pursue Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes During Hostilities, 24 VA. J. INTL L. 97, 98 (1983) (detailing theory as to why United 
Nations is unable to enforce collective security); see, e.g., United Nations Resolution-Protec-
tion of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & 
POL'y 525, 525-28 (1990) (recognizing problem of global climate change, encouraging a variety 
of programs and international cooperative meetings, and requesting initiation of action leading 
to comprehensive review and recommendations for strategies to address global warming); 
Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the 
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, in EARTH 
SUMMIT-AGENDA 21: THE UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME OF ACTION FROM RIO 291, 291-94 
(1992) [hereinafter Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement] (comprehensively reviewing 
resource, economic, and scientific concerns raised by the international exploitation of forest 
resources, but again without any legitimating, action-forcing or legally enforceable powers). See 
generally Kovar, supra note 42 (evaluating detailed planning, drafting, and negotiating involved 
in the formulation of the twenty-one nonbinding principles issued by the Rio Conference on 
Environment and Development). 
47 See, e.g., Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement, supra note 46, at 291-94. 
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ment powers accorded to the United Nations may help explain the 
slow drafting process that goes into the formations of United Nations 
resolutions, statements of principle, and declarations.48 
While international organizations specifically, and the international 
community generally, are grappling actively with environmental is-
sues, there is no immediate likelihood that individual states will cede 
sovereignty in the interest of a universal approach to environmental 
protection.49 While United Nations treaties may permit the monitor-
ing of environmental compliance, no United Nations treaty grants 
realistic enforcement powers.5O 
Judge Amadeo Postiglione of Italy has proposed an International 
Court for the Environment to address this enforcement issue. Judge 
Postiglione's proposal echoes the desires of many nations for a forum 
for the adjudication of international environmental disputes.51 Judge 
Postiglione bases his call to defend the international environment 
on the inalienable heritage of every citizen of every nation. 52 Judge 
Postiglione's proposal distinguishes the proposed International Court 
for the Environment (ICE) from the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ).53 The proposed ICE will fill a role similar to the ICJ, but will 
have a separate, environmental, jurisdiction.54 A body such as the 
ICE, however, likely will suffer from the same discretionary jurisdic-
tional problems as the ICJ.55 While there is no doubt that the establish-
ment of the ICE would raise the moral level of debate and provide a 
dedicated and accelerated forum for international environmental dis-
pute resolution, the ICE would still lack enforcement power.56 More-
over, it is precisely the type of activities that are beyond the enforce-
ment powers of the ICJ that cause the most severe damage to the 
international environment. Without enforcement power, the proposed 
ICE would be powerless to combat the most severe instances of 
48 See generally Pax, supra note 40. 
49 See H. Alders, Toward the 1992 World Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in BIODIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 3 (Simone Bilderbeek ed., 1992) (noting that before Rio 
Conference United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) office headquartered in Kenya 
had 152 separate treaties on file). 
50 Id. 
5! See Amadeo Postiglione, A More Efficient International Law on the Environment and 
Setting up an International Court for the Environment Within the United Nations, 20 ENVTL. 
L. 321, 323 (1990). 
52Id. at 324. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 325. 
55 See id. 
56 Postiglione, supra note 51, at 325. See generally Pax, supra note 40. 
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environmental degradation and destruction. And the desire to pre-
serve the sovereign right to destroy the environment would drive the 
refusal of individual states to cede enforcement power to such an 
International Court. 
For nationalist, economic, and political reasons, sovereignty is likely 
to triumph over sustainability. As national pride rejects the oversight 
of the international community, as short-term economic needs outrank 
long-term planning, and as political gain overshadows generational 
equity, the use of sovereignty principles to justify ignoring the im-
perative of sustainable development likely will continue. 
III. MOST FAVORED NATION TRADING STATUS 
A. Development and Administration 
The use of economic power to accomplish diplomatic goals has a long 
and detailed history. 57 As one of the world's most powerful economic 
actors in the last one hundred years, the United States has actively 
wielded economic sanctions.58 Since at least 1951, the United States 
has used MFN status to achieve diplomatic ends.59 The concept of 
MFN status is rooted in international treaty law and is a cornerstone 
of reciprocal international trade as conceived by the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).60 GATT anticipates that signees 
will confer MFN status on one-another as a means of strengthening 
trade.61 The application of MFN status originally was conceived as a 
Cold War tactic to utilize American economic strength to pressure the 
Warsaw Pact nations by conferring trade privileges based upon a 
state's adherence to American ideological dictates.62 By granting MFN 
status based upon adherence to American ideological dictates, the 
United States hoped to divide Soviet allies.63 Thus, from the beginning 
of MFN status application, the possibility of restoration of MFN 
status by executive order has provided an incentive for states to 
57 SeeJ. Fornara, Plutarch and the Megarian Decree, 211 YALE CLASSICAL STUD. 213, 219-20 
(1975), quoted in Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Hap-
hazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1168-70 n.18 (1987). 
58 See id. 
59 See Weisberg, supra note 16, at 10; see also Lansing & Rose, supra note 17, at 333-34 (noting 
that MFN status developed and used by the United States earlier than 1951, but as an economic 
measure, not a foreign policy instrumentality). 
60 See Robert H. Brumley, Jackson-Vanik: Hard Facts, Bad Law?, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 363, 365 
(1990). 
61Id. 
62 Id. 
63 See Lansing & Rose, supra note 17, at 334. 
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maintain trade relations with the United States based upon ideologi-
cal affinity.64 
The modern application of MFN status took shape in 1974, when 
Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 
1974.65 The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was a response to the Nixon 
administration's attempt to negotiate a trade agreement with the 
Soviet Union.66 Under the original Amendment, the President is di-
rected to deny MFN status to states which unduly restrict emigra-
tion.67 The Amendment contains a waiver provision by which the 
President can renew annual MFN status on a discretionary basis.68 
The last two decades have seen an increase in the diplomatic use, 
as well as deliberations concerning the diplomatic use, of MFN status 
to address a broad range of human rights issues.69 In the first five 
years after the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the grant-
ing ofMFN status was expressly linked to human rights three times.70 
MFN status was conditioned on the improvement of internal human 
rights practices in treaties with Romania, Hungary, and China.71 Be-
cause all three nations had nonmarket commercial economies, trade 
with the United States provided access to crucial markets.72 The need 
for access to American markets and hard currency eventually over-
rode questions of internal ideological and political control.73 Under the 
pressure of MFN status revocation, all three nations agreed to the 
United States' treaty terms.74 A five-year analysis of the effect of 
linking human rights issues with MFN status discerned a willingness 
by totalitarian nations to adhere more closely to American human 
rights standards in order to gain access to American markets.75 That 
Romania later contested the suspension of-and ultimately lost-
MFN status and that China's MFN status would be the subject of 
debate both within the United States and between the United States 
and China are examples of the value placed on trade relations with 
64 See Brumley, supra note 60, at 365. 
65 Id. 
66 See generally Lansing & Rose, supra note 17. 
67 19 U.S.c. § 2432(1) (1974). The Amendment was primarily directed at the Soviet Union in 
order to encourage a less-restrictive policy concerning the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. 
See Lansing & Rose, supra note 17, at 343. 
68 19 U.S.C. §§ 2432(c)(1)(A), (B) (1974). 
69 See McMahon, supra note 14, at 536-37. 
7°Id. 
71 Id. at 534-36. 
72Id. 
73Id. 
74 See McMahon, supra note 14, at 534-36. 
75 See id. at 538. 
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the United States by countries desiring broader markets.76 In the 
early cases of the use of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, there were 
very few instances where the United States had to use the threat of 
MFN status nonrenewal to enforce compliance. 
Since the Jackson-Yanik Amendment in 1974, MFN status has been 
used regularly as a foreign policy instrument-although some com-
mentators have questioned the success of MFN status restrictions on 
the emigration policies of the Soviet Union.77 The continuing public 
policy debate regarding the morality and economy of the United 
States trade relationship with China provides a vivid current example 
of the dynamics of the MFN process.78 Today, MFN status is granted 
by the President based on the codification of the original Jackson-
Yanik Amendment.79 There are three main considerations in deter-
mining whether a country should be subjected to discriminatory trade 
practices: (1) the denial of the right of citizens to emigrate; (2) the 
imposition of onerous exit fees for emigration; and (3) the imposition 
of taxes, fees, or fines on citizens who express a desire to leave the 
country.80 When granting or renewing MFN status, the President is 
required to report to Congress that a specific state is not imposing 
undue strictures on citizen desires to emigrate.81 If neither the House 
of Representatives nor the Senate individually passes a resolution in 
opposition to the President's determination, MFN status will be ex-
tended or reinstated to the country in question.82 In the case of a 
bilateral trade agreement between the affected state and the United 
States, MFN status will be valid for up to three years.83 After the 
three-year period expires, MFN status will be subject to automatic 
renewal based upon the President's discretion and pending no Con-
gressional override.84 Traditionally used to regulate trade between the 
United States and nonmarket economy nations, the Jackson-Vanik 
76 See Lucille Barale, U.S. MFN Renewal for China: The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, E. 
ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., June 15, 1990, at 10. 
77 See generally Brumley, supra note 60. 
78 See generally Drinan & Kuo, supra note 15, at 22. See A New China Policy for China, Bus. 
WK., May 17, 1993, at 138. 
79 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1974). 
80 19 U.S.C. §§ 2432(a)(1)-(3) (1974); see Brumley, supra note 60, at 365 n.14 (specifications 
regarding excessive exit fees stem from Soviet Union's attempts to impose exit taxes as high 
as 20 times the annual salary of Jewish Soviet scientists wishing to emigrate). The overriding 
policy of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is "to assure the continued dedication of the United 
States to fundamental human rights." 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1974). 
81 19 U.S.C. § 2432(c) (1974). 
82 S. REP. No. 93-1248, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 207 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 
7213. 
83 See Brumley, supra note 60, at 365 n.34. 
84 [d. 
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Amendment's application of MFN status is most often debated when 
human rights issues are involved.85 In the determination of MFN 
status by the President, the statutory language concerning emigra-
tion has been applied to states that have far more general human 
rights problems.86 For example, a Romanian crackdown on political 
and religious freedoms in the 1980s led to a Reagan administration 
decision not to renew Romania's MFN status.87 Poland was similarly 
sanctioned for human rights violations during the period 1982-1987.88 
B. MFN Status as Policy: China 
The recent debate on human rights-related MFN sanctions for 
China has reinforced the public perception of MFN status as a human 
rights policy enforcement tooP9 In 1980, President Carter extended 
MFN status to China.90 MFN status has been renewed to China every 
year since 1980.91 Since China's crackdown on the pro-democracy move-
ment that reached a public peak at Tienanmen Square, however, the 
extension of MFN status for China has been a controversial subject.92 
Indeed, extension of MFN status to China is now seen by politicians, 
activists, and commentators as a key battleground for international 
human rights.93 
The debate involving MFN sanctions for China has heightened 
considerably since the events at Tienanmen Square.94 After the Chi-
nese government used tanks and heavy artillery to quell the student 
demonstrations at Tienanmen Square, the government arrested or 
detained more than 700 students for their involvement in the pro-de-
mocracy movement.95 The extensive media coverage of Tienanmen 
Square, complete with video images of an overwhelming and deadly 
show of force against peaceful and unarmed protesters, virtually in-
sured a reaction from American policymakers.96 Since the televised 
85 See Barale, supra note 76, at 10. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See, e.g., David Corn, Pump up the Pretense: Reebok and Human Rights, THE NATION, 
Aug. 26, 1991, at 219; Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Foes of Child Slavery Gaining Clout, BOSTON 
HERALD, Dec. 11, 1993, at 25; Aryeh Neier, Watching Rights, THE NATION, June 3, 1991, at 727. 
90 See Weisberg, supra note 16, at II. 
91 See id. 
92 See generally Drinan & Kuo, supra note 15. 
93 See id.; see also Spiking the MFN Weapon, NAT'L J., May 22, 1993, at 1245. 
94 See Drinan & Kuo, supra note 15. 
95 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, abstracted in 14 HUM. RTS. INTERNET REP., at 203 (1990-1991). 
96 See Instant News, THE BOSTON PHOENIX, June 10, 1994, at 10. See generally Lucille Barale, 
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coverage of the Vietnam War, the transmission of live images of 
government sanctioned military oppression has been the impetus for 
the repulsion of the American public and the reaction of the American 
government.97 Congressional pressure on the President to sanction 
China began soon after the American public saw the Chinese govern-
ment put down the pro-democracy movement.98 When President Bush 
utilized the Jackson-Vanik Amendment waiver procedure to renew 
MFN status to China, both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate reacted by introducing resolutions to deny MFN status to 
China on the same day.99 
Proponents of the continued extension of MFN status to China, 
until recently confined to the Clinton administration and American 
businesses with interests in the region, claim that trading with China 
will continue to expose the Chinese to a Western conception of human 
rights that will ultimately be adopted.1°O The principal argument of 
the activists and politicians who oppose the extension of MFN status 
to China is that the United States should use economic influence 
directly to promote international human rights.101 Thus, the J ackson-
Vanik Amendment, drafted as a congressional foreign policy response 
to Soviet emigration restrictions, is now used as an executive foreign 
policy instrument to address human rights concerns in several na-
tions.102 
The use of MFN status threats by the Clinton administration is 
being executed through a series of high-level contacts with China.103 
The Clinton trade policy toward China is inescapably intertwined 
with concerns about the human rights of Chinese citizens, including 
issues of political expression and the use of forced prison labor by 
Chinese government industry.104 There is evidence that China's desire 
Chiru:L Befare Tieru:Lnman: The Economic Background to a Political Disaster, E. ASIAN Ex-
ECUTIVE REP., Oct. 15, 1989. 
97 See Edward Jay Epstein, NEWS FROM NOWHERE: TELEVISION AND THE NEWS 1,239-41 
(1973); Instant News, supra note 96, at 10. 
98 See Barale, supra note 76. A bipartisan Senate resolution, S.J. 325, to deny MFN status to 
China for a one year period was introduced by Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) and Senator Alphonse 
D'Amato (R-NY). In addition, H.J. Res. 581 and H.J. Res. 586, resolutions in disagreement with 
the President's determination, were introduced by separate groups of representatives. Both the 
Senate and House of Representatives resolutions were introduced within a day of the Presi-
dent's decision to continue MFN status to China. Id. 
99 Id. 
100 See Drinan & Kuo, supra note 15, at 23; see also A New Policy far a New Chiru:L, Bus. WK., 
May 17, 1993, at 138. 
101 See Drinan & Kuo, supra note 15, at 13. 
102 Id. at 22 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2432(l) (1974». 
103 See Thomas L. Friedman, Bentsen Says China Isn't Doing Enough on Human Rights, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,1994, at A6. 
104 See id. 
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for normalized trade relations with the United States is resulting in 
some concessions on human rights issues, including the freeing of 
some human rights protesters from Chinese prisons.105 China's access 
to American markets, resulting in an annual trade surplus of $25 
billion, is a crucial component of China's economic expansion.loo To 
maintain MFN status, China's government has been willing to re-ex-
amine policies ranging from trade-specific issues, such as the use of 
prison labor,l07 to the release of political prisoners from the Tienanmen 
Square protest. lOS 
Highly public recent consultations with American trade officials 
concerning human rights are part of an effort by China's government 
to erase the negative perceptions of both the American public and 
American policymakers.109 China, the world's most populous nation, is 
enjoying a strong, though inconsistent, record of economic growth.110 
Yet, there is increasing evidence that China fears a negative percep-
tion in the eyes of the international community.111 China's government 
has even hired a public relations firm to polish China's image as a 
modern, progressive state.112 This may help counter the negative per-
ception of China's human rights policies that has penetrated into 
American popular culture.113 China's human rights concessions are 
designed to convince the American public and policymakers to pro-
vide a supportive climate for the renewal of MFN status to China.114 
Examination of China's MFN status indicates the potential deter-
rent effect of trade sanctions. While China's MFN status has never 
been revoked, China's human rights concessions in the face of threat-
ened revocation of MFN status demonstrate the power of the threat 
105 Patrick Tyler, China Promises U.S. 7b Try 7b Improve It's Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 16, 1994, at AI. 
106 See Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Pares Imports of China's Fabrics in a Punitive Move, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1994, at A6 (citing China's trade surplus with United States as second only to 
Japan's trade surplus with the United States). 
107 See Friedman, supra note 103, at A6. 
108 Patrick Tyler, Rights in China Improve, U.S. Envoy Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1994, at A5. 
109 See Friedman, supra note 103, at A6. 
110 See Patrick Tyler, While a Sluggish Japan Sighs Amid Asia's Roaring Tigers: China; 
Slower Growth, Still Spectacular, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1994, at CI. 
111 See Robert Scheer, Flack Attack: Political Involvement of Hill and Knowlton Inc., PLAY-
BOY, June 1992, at 51 (detailing national and international political and media influence of public 
relations firm hired by China for promotional purposes during 1992 MFN status renewal). 
112 See id. 
113 See William Oscar Johnson, An Olympian Stand on China, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 7, 
1993, at SO. 
114 See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 105, at Al (detailing a congressional visit to China and meeting 
with Chinese officials, followed by public news conference). 
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of MFN sanctions.1l5 The deterrent effect of the threat of MFN status 
revocation may not only slow policies that are offensive or inimical to 
American interests, but also may prevent the advancement of such 
policies and the adoption of future offensive policies.1l6 While punitive 
measures which follow an action counter to American policy or inter-
ests may have limited effect, the continuing linkage between MFN 
status and human rights provides a continuing incentive for America's 
trading partners to observe human rights conventions.ll7 This is in 
contrast to post-policy sanctions that can have no impact on initial 
policy formation.1l8 Additionally, American sanctions may have the 
added impact of deterring the actions of other nations. Sanctions by 
the United States may also generate international criticism of the 
offending nation.ll9 
The successful use of MFN sanctions by the Clinton administration 
demonstrates the importance of MFN status to China.l20 China's gov-
ernment has pegged the country's future to economic growth; and this 
growth will be speeded through favorable access to foreign markets, 
specifically that of the United States.121 When MFN sanctions threaten 
China's economic well-being, the Chinese government appears willing 
to listen to the policy demands of the United States. 
IV. MFN STATUS AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ToOL 
The gravity of the pace of international environmental destruction, 
combined with the demonstrated lack of enforcement powers by the 
international community, indicates a need for bold leadership on the 
environment.l22 While the role of the United Nations in international 
consensus-building is established, and the role of international trea-
ties has a compelling importance, the need for an aggressive, coopera-
tive, case-by-case approach to international environmental destruc-
tion is clear.123 The gravity of the environmental crisis demands that 
the United States, through the use of economic power manifested as 
115 See Weisberg, supra note 16, at 10. 
116 See David Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L 
& COMPo L. 231, 278 (1977). 
117 See id. 
118 See Lansing & Rose, supra note 17, at 344. 
119 See Weissbrodt, supra note 116, at 278. 
120 See Tyler, supra note 105, at AI. 
121 [d. 
122 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Arend, supra note 46, at 98. 
123 See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 9; Arend, 
supra note 46, at 98. 
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MFN sanctions, attempt to force environmental compliance.l24 The 
role of the United States should be neither universal nor unilateral. 
Rather, the United States should act when the international commu-
nity has recognized a compelling environmental need. 
The use by the United States of MFN sanctions to address envi-
ronmental issues should be predicated on the occurrence of three 
different situations, one or more of which would demonstrate a com-
pelling environmental need: (1) when the United Nations has re-
viewed an environmental situation and recommended certain action; 
(2) when there are actual or threatened transboundary environmental 
effects; or (3) when an international tribunal has ruled against a rogue 
nation. When one or more of these situations occurs, the United 
States should begin to compel compliance through economic means. 
The process for this type of international review is already in place.125 
Difficulties arise, however, due to the lack of ability to enforce findings 
or judgments.l26 MFN sanctions could provide the needed enforcement 
mechanism. Through the use of MFN sanctions, the United States 
could effect the crucial step of enforcing compliance with international 
decisions.127 Although trade sanctions often signal the failure of nego-
tiations, the threat of the withdrawal of MFN status has been suf-
ficient to enforce compliance with American policy goals in the past.l28 
When sanctions are applied, economic pressure from within the target 
nation may build to the point where the government deems compli-
ance a reasonable cost of access to markets in the United States.129 
That China, long resistant to external pressures regarding internal 
human rights practices, was willing to alter internal human rights 
practices indicates the power of United States economic sanctions.l30 
China's intransigence on human rights finally is collapsing as the 
Chinese government fully considers the costs of exclusion from United 
States markets.13l China's compromise on long-held principles of in-
124 Cf. Drinan & Kuo, supra note 15, at 22 (noting that use of trade sanctions to enforce human 
rights compliance is well established). 
125 See supra notes 53--55 and accompanying text. 
126 See, e.g., Pax, supra note 40, at 471 (noting that because of the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms inherent in international judicial decisions, the victory won by Nicaragua at the 
International Court of Justice had only symbolic significance, legitimacy, and deterrence value). 
127 See Barale, supra note 76, at 10 (describing the traditional linkage between human rights 
and trade); Drinan & Kuo, supra note 15, at 22 (suggesting that international environmental 
compliance could operate in a fashion parallel to international human rights linkage). 
128 See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 14, at 534. 
129 See Friedman, supra note 106, at A6. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
1995] ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 687 
ternal sovereignty, signals that the Chinese are concerned about ac-
cess to commercial markets in the United States.132 
As states face demands by the United States for compliance with 
internationally reviewed and recommended environmental policies, 
the restriction from American markets may force a similar change of 
policy.133 American policy assumes that economic growth, as assisted 
by the United States, will lead to political reform.l34 On the other 
hand, the United States must realize that there are limits to a nation's 
ability or willingness to change.135 
MFN sanctions could be supplemented by the use of American 
influence with international lending agencies.136 The J ackson-Vanik 
Amendment already provides for the restriction of American credit 
and investment guarantees;137 and the United States could use extra-
statutory persuasion to convince the Export-Import Bank, the World 
Bank, and regional development banks to assist in restricting loans 
to environmental scofflaws.l38 In addition, because MFN sanctions 
would only begin after an international community consensus, the 
United Nations and international leaders might be willing to join the 
call to persuade international lenders to boycott nations engaging in 
destructive environmental practices.139 
The combination of direct and indirect American economic force 
may soften the hegemonic appearance of American sanctions alone. 
Coupled with international and American demands for environmental 
compliance the United Nations could coordinate a system of economic 
and environmental analysis to show target nations the long-term 
benefits of sustainable development.14o For example, the World Bank 
network of financial and environmental analysts could demonstrate 
the true costs of destructive environmental stewardship.14l 
132Id. 
133 See id. 
134 See Friedman, supra note 106, at A6. 
135 See Mary Curtius, China Abuses Continue, U.S. Asserts, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1994, at 
AI, A5 (noting that Chinese government officials have indicated there is a limit to human rights 
concessions to preserve trade). 
136 See Aid and the Environment, supra note 11, at 54. 
137 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1974). 
138 See Aid and the Environment, supra note 11, at 54. 
139 See Arend, supra note 46, at 98. 
140 See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 4. 
141 See Aid and the Environment, supra note 11, at 54. 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF MFN SANCTIONS 
A. Tactics 
The implementation of MFN sanctions to address environmental 
issues would work best as a considered, targeted, and internationally 
supported exercise to slow destructive environmental practices. Con-
sideration of when to use MFN sanctions is important because the 
economic reality of trade sanctions can be supplemented by the moral 
power of world opinion. Careful consideration and review of MFN 
sanctions is also essential to insure that environmental concerns are 
concurrent with American policy goals. If the United States decided 
to impose environmental sanctions on a crucial military ally in an 
unstable region of the world, a policy conflict would ensue. The United 
States Supreme Court has held that environmental considerations do 
not trump national security considerations and, thus, this precedent 
may harm MFN sanctions as a future diplomatic tool.142 
Careful targeting of MFN sanctions is also essential to success. In 
regions known for environmental destruction, the targeting of one 
nation may have a ripple effect which will cause other nations to 
adhere to international standards in order to avoid their own trade 
sanctions. Alternatively, the blanket imposition of MFN sanctions on 
a region could cause all nations to band together in order to withstand 
economic pressures by the United States. 
International support is essential to effective sanctions imposed by 
the United States. If the United Nations conducts research and con-
cludes that a significant environmental issue exists, or if an interna-
tional treaty, declaration, or statement of principle addresses the 
issue, the United States then acts as the enforcement agent of inter-
national agreement and opinion. The targeted country will then have 
limited recourse to sympathetic nations if most nations are initially 
allied against it. Moreover, unlike human rights violations, which have 
little direct effect outside national borders, a community that sup-
ports the sanction of negative environmental practices, then may be 
protecting itself from the future consequences of such practices. 
142 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 306 (1982) (holding that suit by 
Puerto Rico to enjoin United States military exercises that deposited military ordinance in 
waters off Puerto Rico was trumped by importance of national security considerations). This 
trend of cases is likely to serve as an analog for nations claiming that their national security 
needs must supersede international environmental considerations. See id. 
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B. Case Study: Indonesia 
The use of MFN sanctions by the United States to enforce the will 
of the international community will be most effective in situations of 
recognized environmental urgency. The use ofMFN sanctions to address 
rapid rainforest deforestation in Indonesia presents a case study of 
just such urgency. 
The island nation of Indonesia contains some of the world's most 
concentrated rainforests, with more than half the nation's land mass 
covered with virgin jungles.143 Despite the volume of rainforests, In-
donesia still suffers the highest rate of forest loss in all of Asia.l44 
Tropical rainforests contain some of the world's most concentrated 
habitats, accounting for the total habitats of more than seventy-five 
percent of all living creatures.145 Additionally, the carbon-absorbing 
capacities of large tracts of forested land are recognized as essential 
in the perpetuation of air quality.146 But even as Indonesia's govern-
ment begins to face the economic questions of nonsustainable devel-
opment practices, long-term planning is subsumed by short-term po-
litical and economic realities.147 
Indonesia's rapid economic growth, as measured by gross domestic 
product, has increased by more than six percent annually in 1990, 
1991, and 1992, and has advanced by an average of more than five 
percent every year since 1970.148 The forest products industry is a key 
component of Indonesian economic growth, employing 350,000 peo-
ple.149 World demand for Indonesian woods creates a thriving market 
for the raw material-from Japan's need for twenty billion chopsticks 
a year to the United States' annual purchase of more than 130 million 
tropical rainforest-wood pencils.150 The timber industry accounted for 
143 Rira Permatasari, Indonesia: Conflict over Economic Crisis, Accord on the Roots, INTER 
PRESS SERVo Mar. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inter Press Service File. 
144 Id. 
145 School Year Begins with a Fourth "R"-The Rainforest, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 17, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR Newswire File. 
146 Leah Makabenta, Earth Summit: South East Asians Tell West To Put up or Shut up, 
INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inter Press Service 
File. 
147 See Permatasari, supra note 143. 
148 Thomas Duestenberg, Trade Investments in the U.S.-East Asian Relationship, 17 WASH. 
Q. 70, 71 (1992). 
149 Rainer Trede, Sustainable Forest Use Can Work in Tropical Areas, WORLD WOOD, Apr. 
1992, at 20, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World Wood File. 
150 See Dorothy MacDonald, Women Have Role in Healthy Planet, VANCOUVER SUN, Feb. 18, 
1992, at A3; Janita Poe, In the World of the Politically Right, Pencils Can Be the Wrong Stuff, 
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1993, at 1. 
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$5.15 billion in exports, about one-fourth of Indonesia's total industrial 
exports for 1992.151 
The Indonesian government has begun to respond to internal and 
international environmentalist pressures with logging export bans, 
reforestation programs, and research programs for forest develop-
ment and management.152 Certain branches of the Indonesian govern-
ment have also sought to persuade lenders to consider linking eco-
nomic development loans to environmental concerns, but will set no 
deadlines, nor consider fines for noncompliance.153 
Although Indonesia is attempting currently to make industry more 
aware of environmental issues and has laws that penalize environmen-
tally destructive industries, prosecution is rare. l54 For example, Indo-
nesia's largest timber concern, the Barito Pacific Company, was fined 
more than $4 million for illegal logging practices in 1991, but the fine 
has yet to be paid because the government has yet to legally pursue 
payment.155 
As a developing nation in possession of a vast natural resource, with 
limited industry regulation it is no surprise that Indonesia is destroy-
ing rainforest at a rate fifty percent higher than sustainable forestry 
allows.156 Despite complaints by environmental groups, concerning the 
role of the timber industry in rainforest destruction, the industry's 
economic influence has been increasing.157 Despite the concerns of 
Indonesia's government and a number of active nongovernmental 
organizations, Indonesia is experiencing some of the most rapid de-
forestation in Asia.l58 Further, despite the overwhelming evidence 
that nonsustainable development of Indonesian rainforest will have 
long-term negative effects both nationally and internationally, neither 
the political will nor the economic power exists to enforce environ-
mental priorities in the short-term.159 
151 Indonesia Plans Independent Logging Body, REUTERS EuR. Bus. REP., Sept. 6, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, N exis Library, Reuters File. 
152 See Trede, supra note 149, at 20. 
153 Indonesia Minister Seeks Economy-Environment Link, REUTERS LIB. REP., Aug. 23, 
1993, available in LEXIS, N exis Library, Reuters File. 
154 Indonesia Wants To Link Bank Loans to the Environment, REUTERS MONEY REP., Aug. 
5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. 
155 P.T. Barito Stock Offering; Investment in Rainforest Destruction; Rainforest Action Net-
work Cautions Not To Purchase Stocks, Bus. WIRE, Aug. 31,1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
File, Business Wire File. 
156 See Indonesia Plans Independent Logging Body, supra note 151. 
157 Indonesia's Barito Debut Typically Dramatic, REUTERS ASIA-PAC. Bus. REP., Oct. 1993, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. 
158 See Permatasari, supra note 143, at 1. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The case of rainforest destruction in Indonesia provides a clear 
example of the potential utility of MFN sanctions by the United 
States to force environmental compliance. Rainforest destruction is a 
result of national economic goals and is protected by recognized norms 
of national sovereignty. Even in the face of compelling evidence of the 
long- and short-term dangers inherent in rainforest destruction, the 
Indonesian government allows continuing and unsustainable environ-
mental exploitation. Only American trade sanctions have the eco-
nomic and political power to compel the Indonesian government to act 
in the long-term national and international interest. 
Swift and resolute action is now needed to stem the destruction of 
the world's natural resources. Even more imperative is to begin to 
adopt practices to protect crucial resources that can be preserved and 
utilized through sustainable development. The United States should 
institute a policy of using MFN sanctions to enforce international 
environmental compliance. By basing sanctions on a careful review of 
scientific evidence and international jurisprudence, the United States 
could impose a workable model supported by international political 
and judicial opinions. 
Developing nations may complain about the imperialist nature of 
the imposition of American environmental standards. But there is 
clear scientific evidence that sustainable environmental policies will 
benefit the targeted nations in the long-term. If the United States 
uses MFN sanctions as a wedge to open negotiations with offending 
nations, it is then likely that the United States can offer enough 
inducements in the form of loan guarantees, credits, and technology 
transfers, to win voluntary compliance. Thus MFN sanctions may be 
most effective as a threat to encourage negotiation. 
The threat of sanctions from the United States to compel environ-
mental compliance would send a powerful signal around the world. 
Trade with the United States is, or could be, a major economic benefit 
to most countries. Further, this policy may put internal pressure on 
the United States to set higher domestic environmental standards. 
The risk of appearing as an environmental hypocrite might then force 
the United States to set exemplary standards. 
Laws against trans boundary pollution and literally hundreds of 
international treaties to preserve the environment are already in 
place. The scientific and political consensus exists internationally to 
confront the pressing environmental crisis and to pursue fundamental 
goals of environmental sustainability. If the United States will put 
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economic power and international prestige on the line, these goals can 
become a reality. 
International sanctions and international legal judgments lack the 
enforcement power that would make them legitimate. With very little 
cost to the United States, a cost we currently are willing to bear to 
enforce human rights concerns, the United States could use a demon-
strably effective, bureaucratically prepared policy to preserve the 
world's environmental future. As the only nation capable of enforcing 
the environmental will of the world community and preserving the 
environmental patrimony of the next generation, the United States 
will be the only nation to blame if we squander this opportunity. 
